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Preface
At the very heart of our ambition as civil society 
organisations is a commitment and belief that a more 
equitable, just and inclusive Ireland is possible.  The 
members of the Community Platform are motivated 
by a vision for Ireland in which development means an 
increasingly fair society, and in which democracy is defined 
by participation, engagement and pluralism.
The civil society organisations that comprise the Community 
Platform share a commitment to creating a more just and 
equal society, as well as the capacity to generate alternative 
solutions.  We recognise that we have a responsibility to 
drive and to contribute to the emerging debate on the 
nature of Irish society and democracy, which moves beyond 
current realities to foster genuinely creative responses to 
new and intransigent socio-economic challenges. 
The Community Platform commissioned Dr Mary Murphy 
and Professor Peadar Kirby to write this paper to inform 
this process. We asked the authors to critically examine 
existing models of development and responses to exclusion 
and inequality, assessing progress to date, and to present 
their analysis of alternative models of development that 
Ireland could draw on. They have succeeded in presenting a 
paper that poses many challenges and raises questions for 
everyone concerned with anti-poverty, social inclusion and 
equality in Ireland. 
The paper explores the Irish economic success story that 
has dominated debate over the last decade, assesses the 
level of inequality that it has left in its wake, and speculates 
about the general acceptance of this disparity. It raises 
questions about the sustainability and values that underpin 
that model of economic development in Ireland. The paper 
addresses the role of civil society, from the perspective of 
how it engages with the state, how the state has sought to 
define that relationship, and the implications this has for 
civil society organisations. It interrogates the role of the 
state and the commonly held impression of a benign and 
capable state committed to a project of national economic 
and social development. Murphy and Kirby point out that 
those driven to ensure that the market and market friendly 
policies are an end in themselves rather than a means, have 
won hands down the battle for ideas in Ireland. 
Pluralism and ideas are the lifeblood of democracy. Debate, 
critique and discussion are crucial to the development 
of an alternative, more sustainable and equitable model 
of development. Drawing on international practice and 
outlining a number of alternative models of development 
the authors seek to stimulate discussion about a more 
just and equitable model of development. Perhaps most 
importantly, they prompt us to begin to consider the 
values that should inform any future sustainable model of 
development.  Never has this challenge been more urgent, 
as governments all over Europe and the world move to 
privatise profit and socialise loss.  What the world is now 
witnessing is much more than limited market failure, what 
we are seeing is the systemic collapse of market capitalism, 
and in particular financial capitalism.  These realities have 
implications for Ireland’s development model, and in the 
wake of Budget 009 this paper seeks to contribute to 
articulating a ‘better Ireland’.
Everyday members of the Community Platform work for and 
with children, women and men for whom the challenge of 
voicing an alternative vision for Ireland is not a theoretical 
luxury, but a very real, practical and urgent necessity.  
This paper concludes that a better Ireland is possible and 
asks us all to step up to the challenge of ensuring that it 
becomes a reality. In a mature democracy - one that values 
pluralism, diversity and governance - everyone has the 
right to participate in generating an alternative vision, and 
everyone shares the responsibility in ensuring we succeed. 
Democracy is the right 
to choose and the right 
to create alternatives to 
choose from.
IT’S YOUR 
RIGHT
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The aim or purpose of the paper is to be a resource for 
Community Platform (CP) members to reflect on and 
engage critically with the present Irish policy and political 
environment. The paper is simply a resource to stimulate 
discussion. It has not been adopted by the Community 
Platform and is not a Community Platform position paper. 
The paper has two core aims: critical engagement with the 
present Irish models of development; and constructive 
visioning about alternative models of development. The 
paper begins, therefore, by critically reflecting on the current 
Irish model of development, and engages with the key 
debates about wealth, income distribution, poverty and 
equality. It then provides the opportunity to reflect, from an 
equality and poverty perspective, on emerging models of 
development in the shape of a National Economic and Social 
Council (NESC) proposal for a Developmental Welfare State 
(DWS). Finally, it reviews development literature with a view 
to isolating alternative models of development that offer 
the capacity to realise equality and antipoverty outcomes. 
During the time this paper was drafted the Irish and 
global economy has sunk further into recession and the 
economic context in which national development policy 
is framed has shifted significantly. When the paper was 
commissioned a year ago the extent of the subsequent 
collapse of the world financial system was unimaginable. 
The need for real sustainable alternatives has been 
demonstrated beyond doubt. The National Competitiveness 
Council (NCC) published a Discussion Paper on Wellbeing 
and Competitiveness in July 008 which argued that the 
relationship between wellbeing and competitiveness is 
close and mutually dependent. It stressed that the value of 
characteristics that support wellbeing (such as high levels 
of participation in education and employment, and social 
trust) will become even more important as Ireland moves 
towards a knowledge based society and economy. Gaffney 
(July 008) acknowledges the NCC paper as progressing 
acceptance that ‘the definition of national success must be 
amplified well beyond the traditional measures of economic 
wellbeing’ and she argues that conventional measures 
of national wellbeing fail to measure inequality. Gaffney 
also ponders the threat to personal income posed by the 
current economic downturn and implies it will impact on 
people’s sense of wellbeing. She concludes that we need to 
be careful in the way we are talking about and managing 
the complex links between national competitiveness, 
individual income and wellbeing. Agreeing that discourse 
and language matters, this paper argues that, as well 
as avoiding language that adds to people’s sense of 
vulnerability and insecurity, it is also vital to avoid the 
language of blame where the poor and unemployed are 
made to feel at fault for the economic and social failures 
of the current model of development. A more solidaristic 
language is required that moves beyond the individualism 
of the Celtic Tiger. While it is aware of the current serious 
economic climate, this paper aims to contribute to a 
wider and more long-term debate about Ireland’s model 
of development and the scope that exists to change it.
Understanding the ‘Irish model’ –  
what is wrong with the Irish model  
of development? 
Up until recently, the media, political and economic leaders, 
and opinion formers generally heaped praise on Ireland’s 
remarkable success over the past decade and a half. 
However, when examined in a more global context, Ireland’s 
The paper has two core aims: critical engagement with the present
Irish models of development; and constructive visioning about 
alternative models of development.
––
success presents a number of significant paradoxes. 
Essentially these centre on three issues: 
• the dependent nature of our economic growth model 
• the inequitable distribution of the fruits of that growth 
 and
• the role being played by the state in achieving this  
 success. 
Each is considered in turn here.
a) Dependent development: 
Unlike other cases of economic transformation in the  
0th century such as the Nordic social democratic success, 
the East Asian ‘tiger’ economies with their developmental 
states where the state takes a coherent leading role 
in both economic and social transformation, or even 
the less sustained success of industrialization in India, 
Brazil, Argentina and Mexico in the 90s and 90s what 
characterises Ireland’s economic transformation is that it is 
based largely on the state’s success in winning high levels 
of foreign investment, particularly from the United States. 
It is true that this helped lay the foundations of a modern 
and internationally competitive industrial base to the Irish 
economy for the first time, however, the Irish state and the 
indigenous private sector has been far less successful in 
embedding this success in indigenous industry or services. 
The late Irish Times economics editor Paul Tansey drew 
attention again and again in late 00 and early 008 to the 
huge challenge now facing the Irish economy. He wrote that 
the Celtic Tiger economy met its end in 00 as industrial 
employment began to decline and the construction sector 
became the motor of Irish economic growth. By early 008 it 
was becoming more and more obvious that ‘the state simply 
cannot continue to depend on a small and heavily indebted 
domestic population of 4½ million people to provide a 
continuing impetus to economic and social improvement’ 
(Tansey, 008). In this context, an innovative and concerted 
approach to expanding exports is the only feasible route 
to continuing economic success, wrote Tansey. Yet with 
increased competition for foreign investment from India, 
China and eastern European countries, Ireland cannot any 
longer count on returning to a reliance on this sector as the 
motor of growth. Therefore we are facing a major challenge 
in developing indigenous export-oriented dynamic economic 
sectors if we are to continue the levels of economic growth 
we have become used to. The years of the Celtic Tiger served 
to camouflage rather than to resolve this long-standing 
failure to develop indigenous industry. 
1  Economists Gallagher et al (2002) concluded that economic transformation was driven to a large extent by foreign-owned firms in the  
 electronics (including computers), pharmaceutical and financial services industries. It ‘has not been built on the strength of its  
 national system of innovation and improvement,’ they write (Gallagher et al., 2002: 77). So, as US academic Fred Gottheil, put it: ‘What  
 was really Irish about Ireland’s economic performance? That is to say, was it really a Celtic Tiger at work in Ireland or a U.S. Tiger caged  
 in a Celtic zoo?’ He quickly answers his own question by noting that the profit rates as a percent of sales of US multinationals  
 operating in Ireland ‘were scarcely short of awesome’; for example US pharmaceutical companies operating in Ireland had profit rates  
 approaching 50 per cent which compares to 5 per cent profits rates for Irish companies operating in Ireland and for US companies  
 in the US. While there has been some transformation of the domestic economy, the Irish economy still continues to be very much  
 ‘a “platform economy” for foreign multinationals – particularly US’, concludes Gottheil (2003: 731-33).
...the Celtic Tiger economy met its end in 00 
as industrial employment began to decline 
and the construction sector became the motor 
of Irish economic growth. By early 008 it 
was becoming more and more obvious that 
‘the state simply cannot continue to depend 
on a small and heavily indebted domestic 
population of 4½ million people to provide a 
continuing impetus to economic and social 
improvement’ (Tansey, 008)
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The global credit crunch of 008 highlights even 
more dramatically the extent of the challenge 
facing the Irish economy. 
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b) Unequal distribution: 
A second long-standing feature of Irish society is its high 
levels of socio-economic inequality. Like the problem of 
our dependent industrialisation, the Irish state has never 
succeeded in laying the foundations for a more inclusive 
pattern of national development, a feature that was hidden 
for decades by the fact that we exported a significant 
section of our labour force. This feature of the Irish ‘model’ 
has received a lot more public attention than the feature 
outlined above but this has failed to generate either a 
consensus on the nature of the problem, or what policies 
are needed to address it. Disputes about what measure 
of poverty to use (‘consistent’ poverty or relative poverty) 
and the paucity of data on inequality, coupled with a 
very active use of discourse by the state and politicians 
on ‘combating poverty’, on ‘social inclusion’ and on the 
‘equality agenda’, has tended to obfuscate rather than 
to clarify the nature of the problem. The media debate 
about the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) 
book Best of Times? (Fahey, Nolan and Whelan, 00) has 
further reinforced a view that unequal distribution has not 
worsened over the years of the boom and is less serious 
than critics allege. The following section of this report 
disputes this ESRI view and argues that the evidence, taken 
as a whole, adds up to a seriously embedded problem 
of unequal distribution. Unequal distribution has been 
camouflaged over the years of the Celtic Tiger and, far 
from being resolved, remains a most serious problem in 
Irish society today, even taking on some features that 
make today’s situation worse than in previous decades.
c) Role of the state: 
The third major paradox of the ‘Irish model’ that 
distinguishes it from models of successful development 
in other parts of the world relates to the role of the state. 
In other countries that were latecomers to industrial 
development, the state played a central role in interfering 
in the market in order to foster an indigenous industrial 
sector. In the most successful cases (for example, Taiwan 
and South Korea), this sector became internationally 
competitive and won significant export markets. Yet, 
just as in the case of the other two issues highlighted in 
this section, there is a complete lack of consensus in the 
Irish case about the precise role played by the state and, 
indeed, a confusion about what the key issue is in this 
regard. The ESRI in 000 argued that the state has been 
Unequal distribution has been camouflaged over the years of the Celtic Tiger and, far from 
being resolved, remains a most serious problem in Irish society today, even taking on 
some features that make today’s situation worse than in previous decades.
–9–
2 The ESRI claimed in its book Bust to Boom in 2000 that ‘there was a great deal more to Ireland’s success than liberalisation of markets. 
The editors concluded that ‘it is not a simple story of globalization, forced withdrawal of the state and the promotion of neo-liberalism’ 
(Nolan, O’Connell and Whelan, 2000: 1 and 3).
deeply implicated in the entire process, managing both 
economic development and the welfare state’ Two major 
flaws in this argument have served to distort rather than 
clarify debates on the role of the Irish state. The first is 
that it rests on a presumption that if a state plays a role 
in development then that model of development is not 
a case of neo-liberalism. The second flaw is the failure to 
examine the type of state that has played this role. An 
impression is left of a benign and capable state committed 
to a project of national economic and social development. 
Since 000, the debate on the Irish state has moved 
much further, being centered essentially on whether 
the Irish state is a developmental state (similar to the 
kind of state that led coherent projects of national 
economic and social development in East Asia from the 
90s onwards) or a competition state (giving priority to 
economic competitiveness over welfare and equity). Ó 
Riain’s argument that Ireland is a new kind of network 
developmental state, more appropriate to the requirements 
of a globalised world than the more bureaucratic 
developmental states of East Asia (000, 004) influenced 
the NESC proposal of a developmental welfare state (NESC 
DWS 00). The success of countries like South Korea, Taiwan 
and Singapore in building world-class high-tech industrial 
sectors with more equitable distribution of the benefits 
(‘growth with equity’) through the active involvement of the 
state came to be recognised since the 980s as an alternative 
to the dominant free-market approach to development. 
However, the characterisation by NESC and others of the 
Irish state as being similar has been challenged by a number 
of scholars (Dukelow, Boyle, Kirby, Kirby and Murphy) 
who argue that the contrast between the Irish state’s 
effectiveness in winning high levels of foreign investment 
and providing conditions to ensure its success, and the 
same state’s weak and inconsistent welfare effort is best 
understood by recognising the Irish state as a competition 
and not a developmental state. This finds expression in the 
state’s policy of generous funding of supports for industrial 
and innovation policies and its administrative effectiveness 
in these areas, contrasted with its ungenerous funding 
of social benefits and provision and its seeming lack of 
effectiveness in reforming the health services or providing 
suitable and adequate supports for vulnerable groups 
through joined up public services. In furthering this debate, 
a new volume on the Irish state (Adshead, Kirby and Millar, 
008) for the first time interrogates the capacity of the Irish 
state and the role it has played in national development. 
In his contribution, Ó Riain identifies more precisely the 
period between 994 and 000 when some sectors of the 
Irish state played a developmental role whereas since 
000 a tax cutting project has taken over the state as its 
developmentalism has waned. This debate on the state is 
/1  INTRODUCTION
...the challenge we now face is greater 
than at any time in the past due to 
the intensely competitive nature of 
the global marketplace.
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therefore helping to overcome the two major flaws that 
characterised the position of the ESRI authors in 000. First 
it is identifying the precise role that both state and market 
have played in the Irish success and, second, it is beginning 
to examine just how capable the Irish state is.
Conclusions
This brief analysis highlights the extent to which the 
understanding of the Irish success that has dominated 
public and political attitudes and that has been sold 
internationally is an extremely partial and benign one, 
failing to take account of major debates in the social 
In other words, the battle for ideas has been won hands down by 
those with a vested interest in ensuring the state takes an extreme 
market-friendly approach to public policy and in seeking to avoid 
debates about redistributive taxation, adequate social spending 
and provision, and more active state policies to generate more 
successful domestic productive sectors. 
sciences. Stating this underlines the extent to which 
those with a vested interest in promoting such a positive 
view have been allowed to prevail. It is true that their 
views have been critiqued in some academic circles 
but these critical views get a very limited public airing, 
so that a benign and one-sided view dominated in the 
public arena. This indicates the failure of opinion formers 
and more critical social actors (principally left-wing 
parties, trade unions and the community and voluntary 
sector) to contest the dominant view in public and 
political fora (including within social partnership).
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a) Wealth distribution: 
Almost all discussion of distribution in Ireland relates to 
distribution of income rather than distribution of wealth. 
Since wealth is generally far more unequally distributed 
than is income (due to the ability of those who hold wealth 
to pass it on in the form of property and other assets such 
as shares or luxury goods such as yachts or paintings), 
discussions of inequality in Ireland generally avoid dealing 
with the worst excesses of inequality. This is partly because 
very little research has been done into wealth inequality 
in Ireland and what has been done is quite dated. While 
journalistic accounts highlight the extent to which an 
extremely wealthy elite has emerged as the main beneficiary 
of the Irish boom, many of whom made their money 
not from productive entrepreneurship but from property 
speculation and as building developers, we know very little 
about this elite and how they are using their new-found 
wealth. One recent estimate (O’Sullivan, 00) estimates 
that the top  % of the population holds 0 % of the wealth, 
the top  % holds 0 % and the top  % holds 40 % of the 
wealth. When the value of home ownership is excluded,  
then the concentration of wealth is even greater with 1 % of the 
population accounting for around 34 % of the wealth. 
Much of this wealth concentration was  
enabled through government tax policy. 
Tax inequity is a key concern for those interested in 
distributional or economic justice. For example, Hughes 
(008) demonstrates that 80 % of the € billion tax relief 
on pensions goes to households with €0,000 or more 
income per annum. When a small number of people 
have large amounts of wealth and many others have few 
resources, society becomes less cohesive. Wealth bestows 
power over other people. Such power can be exercised 
directly through economic decisions to open or close 
businesses, increase rents, move sports stadia out of cities, 
disperse communities, speculate with currencies and 
even bankrupt whole countries. It can also be exercised 
indirectly by way of funding political parties through 
corporate donations and using this access to political 
power to influence government policy. Unequal access 
to wealth and income enables some men to exercise 
physical, sexual or emotional power over women. 
b) Income distribution:
While we know a lot more about the distribution of income 
earned through labour, rent or dividends, our knowledge 
is relatively limited about incomes at the top of the 
distribution (that is, among the richest). However, a number 
of features of the Irish income distribution can be stated 
with some precision. Data from the 00 Survey on Income 
and Living Conditions (SILC) (CSO, 00:,,4) show 
that average gross household income increased by .8% 
year on year to €,0.48 per week in 00, and average 
net disposable household income was €8.44 per week, 
representing a .8% increase on 00. Average equivalised 
net disposable income was €40.84 per week, and the at 
risk of poverty threshold was €0.49 per week based on 
equivalised net disposable income. This compared to €9.4 
per week in 00. It represents an increase of €9. or .%.
What does all this mean for people living in Ireland? 
Comparing Ireland’s income distribution after the Celtic 
Tiger boom with EU and Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries shows that it 
has a very high level of inequality for its level of economic 
development. Comparing it to 0 countries using data 
from around 000, Smeeding and Nolan write that ‘Ireland 
is indeed an outlier among rich nations. Only the United 
States, Russia, and Mexico have higher levels of inequality 
[…] Among the richest OECD nations Ireland has the second 
highest level of inequality’ (Smeeding and Nolan, 004: 9). 
When a small number of people have large amounts of wealth and 
many others have few resources, society becomes less cohesive. 
Wealth bestows power over other people.
/2  DISTRIBUTIONAL ISSUES IN THE IRISH MODEL ––
They find that low-income Irish people in the bottom decile 
(lowest 0 % of earners) in 000 had an income that was 
only 4 % of median income making them among the least 
well-off of the whole sample whereas the top 0 % of Irish 
income earners had an income that is 89 % of the median, 
a little below the average. Ireland’s Gini coefficient was the 
fifth highest in the EU- in 00-04.4 
The latest available EU- figures, which relate to 00, 
show that Lithuania and Poland had the highest at-risk-
of-poverty rates in the EU, at %. Ireland, along with 
Greece and Spain, were third highest, with a rate of 0%. 
The overall rate for the EU- was %. Excluding all social 
transfers Ireland had a lower than average rate of 40%, 
compared to an EU- rate of 4%. In terms of inequality, 
Ireland has very similar levels to the EU averages, with 
a Gini coefficient of % and the income quintile share 
ratio at .0%. Ireland also fell very close to overall EU-
levels in terms of the lower at-risk-of-poverty thresholds 
at 40% and 0% of median equivalised income, with rates 
of % and % respectively. However Ireland, along with 
Lithuania and Poland, had the highest at-risk-of-poverty 
rate at the 0% threshold, with a rate of 8%, compared 
to 4% in the EU- and EU- (CSO, EU-SILC 00, 4).
Trends in relative poverty, a measure of inequality, show 
a steady increase over two decades. Since the initiation 
of the EU Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-
SILC) in 00, data on poverty in Ireland are grouped 
into somewhat different categories making them 
consistent with data across the EU. However, this means 
that it is more difficult to assess longer-term trends 
in Ireland. Trends in the Gini coefficient and in income 
distribution (the ratio of the income of those in the top 
income quintile to those in the bottom quintile) are 
also now regularly measured. Trends in these measures 
over the more recent period are given in Table .
Table 1: Trends in poverty and inequality, 2000-06
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Relative at risk of poverty-gap 19.3 20.7 21.5 19.8 20.8 17.5
Gini coefficient 30.2 30.3 31.1 31.8 32.4 32.4
Income distribution (S80/S20) 4.7 4.8 5.0 5.0 4.9 5.0
Source: CSO, 2004, 2006, 2007.
 The Gini coefficient is the relationship between cumulative shares of the population arranged according to the level of income and 
the cumulative share of total income received by them. If there was perfect equality (i.e. each person receives the same income) the Gini 
coefficient would be 0%. A Gini coefficient of 00% would indicate there was total inequality and the entire national income was in the 
hands of one person. http://www.cso.ie/releasespublications/documents/eu_silc/current/eusilc.pdf
4 Until recently Irish measurements of poverty used mean income whereas the EU used median income. Irish measures have now adopted 
the latter. Mean income is the average of all income (i.e., the total income divided by the number of income earners) whereas median 
income is the mid point in the range of incomes from richest to poorest. The latter is now considered a more accurate reflection of 
averages as the mean income is inflated by the fact that a significant proportion of national income is concentrated in the hands of a 
relatively small group of rich earners.
 Since 00, the EU’s ‘at-risk-of-poverty’ rate has been more centrally adopted in measuring poverty in Ireland. This is the share of 
persons with equivalised income below a given percentage of the national median income (note that median income is used in this 
measure whereas mean or average income had been used previously). The percentage of income used is 0 %.
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The broader distributional picture of what has been 
happening to poverty in Ireland show that up to 00 there 
was a steady if somewhat uneven increase and that an 
improvement occurred in 00. There is less agreement on 
trends in income distribution over the course of the boom. 
The picture of overall income distribution is complicated 
by the fact that different sources offer different pictures of 
what has been happening. First of all, it is interesting to note 
that the evidence on the distribution of earnings (market 
income) over the period 994-000 shows a modest decline 
in inequality over this period as the ratio of the earnings 
of the top and bottom deciles both moved closer to the 
median. As a result, the ratio of the earnings of the top 
decile to those of the bottom decile fell from 4.0 in 994 
to . in 000 (O’Connell and Russell, 00: ); however, 
we have to await more recent figures to see if this trend 
continued since 000.
The Household Budget Surveys of the Central Statistics 
Office show a marked increase in income at the top of the 
distribution and a marked decline at the bottom (Collins and 
Kavanagh, 00: 4-). Nolan and Maitre show modest 
declines in the share of the bottom decile, modest increases 
among deciles in the middle of the distribution and declines 
in the top three deciles. However, in examining trends in 
the share of the top income earners over the period 989-
000 through using tax returns, they find a substantial 
increase in the share of the top decile, from % to 8%. 
The top % saw its share rise sharply in the second half 
of the decade with all the growth in the share of the top 
decile being concentrated among this %. They conclude: 
‘It means that by the end of the 990s, the share of the top 
% was more than twice the level prevailing through the 
90s and 980s. As it happens, most of this growth in turn 
was concentrated in the top 0.%’ (Nolan and Maitre, 00: 
-4). They also conclude controversially that ‘there was 
much less change in the shape of the income distribution 
than is often casually assumed’ (Nolan and Maitre, 00: 
4). This latter conclusion is questionable for three principal 
reasons: It fails to take into account the well-known data 
on trends in relative poverty. It overlooks the concentration 
of income growth among those 0.% super rich top earners 
whose share increased substantially over a short period, 
and it neglects evidence of trends in the distribution 
of functional income. As the data in Table  show, the 
functional distribution of income in Ireland has been more 
and more concentrated by comparison with other countries.8
Table 2: Wage share of total economy, 
Ireland and EU-12, 1960-2006 (% of GDP)
Period Ireland EU-12
1960-70 8 0
1971-80  .
1981-90 . 9.
1991-2000 . .8
2001-06 . 4.4
Source: Statistical Annex of European Economy,  
Spring 2007.
 Even if this data is not conclusive and a lot more research is required to find out exactly what has been happening to Ireland’s income 
distribution, this finding points to a severe worsening of income distribution with a major concentration of gains in the hands of a small 
wealthy elite. This would be consistent with international trends in income distribution in today’s globalised world.
 Functional income is a measure of the share of national income that goes on profits and the share that goes on wages and in the past 
was widely used as a more reliable measure of distribution that the personal income on which Irish debates concentrate.
8 The Irish figure is likely to be inflated by the practice of multinationals in declaring in Ireland profits made elsewhere, what is called 
transfer pricing. However, this is unlikely to account completely for the large decline in the wage share in Ireland over the 990s.
/2  DISTRIBUTIONAL ISSUES IN THE IRISH MODEL ––
Pulling together different sources and measurements Table  summarises overall trends in income distribution in Ireland over 
the course of the Celtic Tiger boom. On balance, the evidence shows that while the lowest decile improved the real shifts 
were at the top decile which gained significantly more income. As discussed earlier, most of this growth was in the top 0.% 
of income earners. While the rest of the picture is more mixed, the overall picture shows high, sustained and, according to 
some measurements, increased inequality and poverty.
Table 3: Overall trends in income distribution, 1994-2006
Relative Income 
Poverty Line
1994 1998 2001 2003 2005 2006
Trend  
1994-2006
50% .0 9.9 .9 . 0.8 8.9 Increase
60% . 9.8 .9 9. 8.  Increase
70% . .9 9. . 8. . Steady
Income Inequality
S80/20 . .0 4. .0 .0  Steady
Gini   9   .4 Steady
Income  
Distribution
1987 1994/5 1999 2005 2006 Change
Trend  
1987-2006
Bottom 20% .0 . .09 .4 .9 -0.4 Slight decrease
20-40% . 0.9 0.4 0. 0.4 -.8 Decrease
40-60% .9 . .0 .4 . -.8 Decrease
60-80% 4. .0 4.8 4.0 .0 -.9 Decrease
Top 20% 40.9 4.4 4.8 4. 44.4 +.4 Significant increase
Richest/poorest Trend
Poorest 10% .8 . .9 . . -0.08 Slight decrease
Richest 10% 4.48 4. .90 .4 8. +.8 Significant increase
Sources: CORI, 2008: 48; Collins and Kavanagh, 2006: 156; sources from various household budget surveys and CSO 2006, 2007.
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This section has deliberately concentrated on trends in 
distribution rather than on poverty despite the fact that 
most of the distributional debate in Ireland is concentrated 
on poverty. This is for three reasons. 
• First, the focus on poverty in the Irish debate 
is serving to obscure rather than to highlight 
distributional trends due to the fruitless debate between 
different conceptions of poverty.9
• The second reason to prefer distribution over 
poverty relates to the fact that a focus on the poor alone 
misses what is happening to the rich: international 
evidence shows that it is more difficult to reduce poverty 
in more unequal societies. So even for those whose 
primary interest is in the poor, the neglect of inequality 
undermines their efforts to reduce poverty. 
• The third reason is that there is a growing body of 
international evidence on the harmful effects of 
inequality for health and wellbeing, for social cohesion 
and for crime. 
London School of Economics political economist, Robert Wade 
has asked ‘Should we worry about income inequality?’ and 
summarised concerns about income inequality as follows:
‘There is fairly good evidence that higher income inequality 
within countries goes with: (1) higher poverty and, 
specifically, a lower contribution of economic growth to 
poverty reduction; (2) higher unemployment; (3) higher 
crime; (4) lower average health; (5) weaker property rights; 
(6) more skewed access to public services and state rule-
setting fora, and lower standards of public services; and (7) 
slower transitions to democratic regimes, and more fragile 
democracies’ (Wade, 2007:115).
The neglect of inequality in Irish public policy therefore 
may carry very serious consequences.
c) Progress made in addressing poverty, 
social exclusion and inequalities:
EU-SILC 00 data demonstrate the progress made in 
halving the number of those living in consistent poverty 
from % in 99 to .9% in 00. There has been no 
significant recent change in the consistent poverty rate, 
with a level of .9% in 00 compared to .0% in 00. 
Members of lone-parent households had the highest levels 
of consistent poverty (.%). Persons living in households 
where the head of household was unemployed (.%) and 
households with no workers (.%) also had high levels of 
consistent poverty (EU-SILC 00: 8,4). 
 
00 EU-SILC data highlight a number of trends about 
who is at risk of poverty. At an overall level, the at-risk-
of-poverty rate decreased from 8.% in 00 to .0% in 
00. This masked the reality that for some groups the 
situation improved while for others it declined. Breaking 
down this figure to identify those who constitute it by 
principal economic status, one can identify a substantial 
decline in the at-risk-of-poverty rate for the elderly, from 
0.% in 00 to .% in 00 (a function of improved 
social welfare increases). Persons living in households 
where the head of household was unemployed (0.8%), a 
student (.%) or ill or disabled (44.4%) were most at risk. 
Unemployed individuals were also a high-risk group, with 
their percentage of those at-risk-of-poverty increasing from 
40.% in 00 to 44.0% in 00. Other high-risk groups 
were ill or disabled individuals (40.8%) and members  
of lone parent households (9.%) (EU-SILC 00: ,, 8).  
The evidence is summarised in Table 4.
9 In its Best of Times? book, the ESRI has further complicated this debate by introducing the concept of vulnerability, arguing that it allows
the ‘tiered levels of deprivation’ that exist in Ireland to be assessed (Whelan, Nolan and Maitre, 00: 0). However, in identifying that 
80 % of the population are not vulnerable, while 0 % are and a further 0 % are consistently poor (their so called 80:0:0 division) these 
authors use the concept in a limited way that negates some of its potential to identify the multiple forms of vulnerability that affect 
wide sectors of the population as they rely more and more on market processes for their livelihoods (see Kirby, 00). For example, the 
ESRI authors acknowledge that vulnerability affects sectors of the population other than the vulnerable group it identifies.  % of the 
so-called ‘non-vulnerable’ group experience difficulty in making ends meet, while  % have difficulty in terms of housing costs (ibid.: 
9, 98). This points therefore to the fact that a significant percentage of those classed as being ‘non-vulnerable’ are in fact exposed to 
potentially serious vulnerabilities, thus undermining the neat 80:0:0 division presented. It is to be hoped that this new concept does 
not further undermine the attempt to reach clarity about the distributional impact of Ireland’s boom.
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There have been changes in the levels of poverty experienced 
by different groups since 994. Over time we have seen the 
emergence of a category of employees whose income is 
not sufficient to lift them out of poverty. Farmers and the 
self-employed other than farmers continue to experience 
poverty but are no longer as visible in the data. Some 
categories of unemployed households have not been able 
to avail of the opportunities offered by the booming market 
to lift themselves out of poverty. In the context of the 008 
recession, unemployment is again becoming one of the 
principal constituents of poverty.0 
The other categories in Table 4 depend largely on state 
transfers to lift them out of poverty and here the growth 
in the percentages of households headed by ill or disabled 
people, by the retired and by those on home duties who fell 
into poverty over the course of the boom relates directly 
to the inadequacy of state transfers to prevent this. The 
significant improvement over recent years in the situation 
of some groups such as the retired reflects increases in 
welfare payments since 00, though their levels of poverty 
still remain substantially above what they were before 
the boom. It is also important to note that, as Collins and 
Table 4: Breakdown of those below 60% of median income by principal economic status
2004 2005 2006
At work 9.8 . 9.
Unemployed .0 . 4.
Students .8 4.8 4.
On home duties 8 .4 0.
Retired . .4 8.
Ill/disabled  . .
Total 100 100 100
Source: CSO, 2007.
0 In October 008 the Live Register as seasonally adjusted stood at 0,00 which represented an increase of 94,00 or % on the same 
month 00. In recent months the Live Register continues to grow at unprecedented rates. A year ago the Standardised Unemployment 
Rate stood at 4.%, now it stands at .%.
Kavanagh put it, ‘consistently, the results of income surveys 
indicate that among all adults, women in Ireland experience 
a greater risk of poverty than men’ (Collins and Kavanagh, 
00: 40). However, data for 00 show an improvement 
in this situation, with the percentage of women in poverty 
declining from 0.8% to 8.% while the rate among men 
rose from 8% to 8.4% (CSO, 00: 4). 00 data (CSO 
00, p 8), however, show almost % of persons living 
in households headed by a female were at risk of poverty, 
compared to 4.% of male-headed households. In addition, 
they were more than twice as likely to be in consistent 
poverty (.% compared to 4.4%). 
What does all this tell us about the Irish model of 
development? Was the Celtic Tiger period successful in 
tackling poverty and inequality? The most important message 
is that poverty figures are sensitive to government action. 
The period saw a new activism in social policy with the 
establishment of the National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS) 
and of the Equality Authority. In 00, the NAPS  
was revised and integrated with the EU National Action Plan 
on Social Inclusion. However, as Cousins has pointed out in 
reference to these strategies and plans, ‘the evidence points 
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to the fact that general statements, objectives and even 
specific targets on poverty have not been translated into 
actual policy measures let alone poverty outcomes’ with 
the result that ‘even where targets have been met, there is 
little indication that policies adopted as part of the NAPS 
process – as opposed to broader economic and political 
developments – were a major contributor’ (Cousins, 00: 
9, 9). The achievement of consistent poverty targets 
in NAPS was therefore as much an outcome of economic 
growth as of government anti-poverty policy. In 00,  
nearly .9% of the population suffered consistent poverty.  
It is now policy that the proportion of the population living 
in consistent poverty is reduced to between % and 4%  
and that consistent poverty is entirely eliminated by 0. 
While it is recognised that the almost halving of numbers 
living in consistent poverty is a real and meaningful 
achievement, it is also the case that very significant levels 
of poverty and income inequality remain as has been 
highlighted in the discussion on relative income poverty 
above. Recent NAPS targets do not reflect the serious nature 
of these stubborn problems. 
The Equality Authority has as its brief to reduce 
discrimination under nine named headings, including 
gender, sexual orientation, political and religious beliefs  
and membership of the Travelling community. This it does 
largely through public education and, where it deems it 
appropriate, providing legal assistance to those making 
complaints of discrimination. Socio-economic inequality 
is not one of its nine grounds and the Authority does 
not focus on the socio-economic dimensions of the nine 
inequalities it deals with. Indeed as Whelan and Layte put 
it in Best of Times? Ireland ‘has not prioritised “equity” 
as an objective’ and has made ‘no concerted attempt to 
equalise incomes through taxation and redistribution’ 
(Whelan and Layte, 00: 8), thus recognising the Irish 
state’s low redistributive effort, despite its extensive 
rhetoric about combating poverty and addressing 
inequality. This failure to conceptualise distributional 
justice and recognition or identity justice as two sides of 
the same coin (a fundamental problem of the NESC DWS 
discussed in the next chapter) is undermining attempts 
to reduce either. Recent initiatives undertaken by CPA 
and the Equality Authority on anti-poverty and equality 
targets and indicators, while moving in the right direction, 
have yet to impact considerably on policy or practice. 
The decision announced in Budget 2009 to 
reduce the Equality Authority budget by 43% 
and to integrate it with the Irish Human Rights 
Commission demonstrates the Irish government’s 
limited and superficial understanding of the 
important role such an equality infrastructure 
can play in reconciling competitiveness and 
wellbeing and in shaping the direction of national 
development.
 People live in consistent poverty when they receive an income below a certain amount and lack two out of  basic items, e.g. a warm 
coat, sufficient food or adequate heating, not being able to go on holiday or buy birthday gifts. The indicators capture the experience of 
both a lower standard of living than the rest of society and being socially excluded from participating in society.
What does all this tell us about the Irish model of development?  
Was the Celtic Tiger period successful in tackling poverty and inequality?  
The most important message is that poverty figures are sensitive to 
government action.
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d) Distributive impact of budgetary 
 policy:
While the structure of the social welfare system saw 
relatively few changes over the boom period, the growth 
in employment meant that the numbers insured under the 
social insurance scheme increased from . million in 98 
to .4 million in 000, with the number of workers fully 
covered increasing from . to . million (O’Donoghue, 00: 
0). As a result the Social Insurance Fund became self-
financing for the first time since it was established. In the 
990s, social expenditure per capita grew substantially faster 
than consumer prices and, apart from Portugal, faster than 
in any other country in the EU-. The value of individual 
benefits also rose relative to the median income, again 
reversing declines over the previous period. Welfare rates 
have risen in absolute terms and have been double the rate 
of inflation in recent years (on average increasing by %  
per annum). 
However, welfare effort is declining in Ireland. Despite 
real increases, welfare spending as a percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP)/Gross National Product (GNP) 
began to fall significantly from .% of GNP in 99 to 
.8% by 000. Spending rose to 9% of GNP in 004 before 
slightly falling back to 8.8% of GNP in 00. Walsh (00: 
) shows that over the period 98 to 00 welfare rates 
have not kept pace with average growth in income which 
grew over that period by % in real terms compared with 
social welfare growth rates of 0%. Those depending on 
welfare (older people, lone parents, disabled people, asylum 
seekers, unemployed) are simply unable to participate 
fully on welfare payments which are less than one third 
of the average industrial wage. There are also significant 
gender issues, with women being more welfare-dependent. 
In addition, particular groups such as asylum seekers are 
particularly harshly treated with a basic payment frozen at 
€9.0 per week since 00. Those who are on low wages 
are also affected by cuts in welfare (for example, medical 
card eligibility has not taken account of inflation) and 
they increasingly have to pay for public services, including 
refuse charges in many local authority areas. They also pay 
the regressive indirect VAT tax at %. Combat Poverty 
research suggests that the poor pay almost double the 
proportion of their income on VAT than do the rich. 
Table  shows the minimum welfare rate and the level 
of the state pension as a percentage of 0% of medium 
income at various dates over the Celtic Tiger boom.
Turning to the distributive impact of budgetary policy, Walsh 
identifies four different periods, roughly corresponding to 
the periods in office of governments since 98. The first 
period (with Fianna Fáil in office and with the Progressive 
Democrats after 990), saw an average gain in budgetary 
policies of .% and most of the gain went to the bottom 
and the top quintiles. The second, (Fianna Fáil with Labour 
until 994 and Fine Gael, Labour and Democratic Left from 
994-9), saw an average gain of .% with the third and 
fourth quintiles gaining most and the poorest actually 
loosing out. In the third and fourth periods, Fianna Fáil 
were back in office with the Progressive Democrats. The 
first of these periods saw an average gain of .%, due 
largely to tax cutting, from which the middle quintiles 
Table 5: Welfare rates 1994-2005 (as % of 60% of median income)
1994 1997 2001 2003 2005
Minimum welfare rate 0   8 
State pension  4  8 8
Source: Walsh, 2007: 31.
 Budget 009 on 4th October 008 increased the rate from % to .%
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did best though all quintiles gained. The second saw an 
average gain of .% with continued tax reductions but 
also increases in welfare. The poorest quintiles gained most 
in this period. This indicates it is clearly possible through 
budgetary tax and social welfare policy to target income 
at different income groups. The data are given in Table .
However, while examination of the ten budgets from 998 
to 00 shows that the combined distributive impact 
benefited the lowest quintile, which received an increase 
of 8%, almost double the average increase of %, when 
the share-out of total budgetary resources is taken into 
account, the top quintile gains the greatest as it receives 
almost one-third of the total. Walsh comments: ‘Using 
the EU measure of income inequality (S80/S0), the 
richest 0 per cent get almost three times the amount 
received by the poorest 0 per cent. This regressive 
outcome is still superior to the distribution of total 
income, where the top quintile has almost five times 
the income of the poorest quintile’ (Walsh, 00: ). 
We can conclude, therefore, that little has 
changed in Ireland’s two-tier state and market 
welfare system: while a basic level of support 
is given to all, the system fails to overturn 
privilege and in many ways acts to reinforce it.
A final way of examining the effectiveness of Ireland’s 
welfare state in reducing poverty is to place it in a 
comparative context. Table  shows the extent to which 
pensions and social transfers reduced the risk of poverty 
in Ireland and in the EU in 000 and in 00. This shows 
that Ireland lags well behind the EU average in its ability to 
reduce poverty. Indeed in 000, only Malta and Cyprus did 
worse than Ireland whereas in 00 only Greece, Spain and 
Cyprus did (though the initial poverty rate for Cyprus was 
well below the Irish rate).
Data given by Smeeding and Nolan (004) tell a similar story 
based on the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). They compare 
market income (pre tax and transfer) poverty with disposable 
Table 6: Distributive impact of budgetary policy, 1987-2007 
 (% gain in disposable income by quintile)
Quintiles 1987-92 1993-97 1998-2002 2003-07
Bottom 8. -0. 8. 8.
2nd -. 0. . 8.
3rd -. .4 .0 .
4th . . 4. .0
Top 4. . .9 .0
Average gain . . . .
Source: Walsh, 2007: 50.
Table 7: Effect of state transfers on reducing the risk of poverty, Ireland and EU, 2000 and 2005
Ireland 2000 EU-15 2000 Ireland 2005 EU-25 2005
Initial risk of poverty rate 37 40 40 43
After pensions 31 23 33 26
After pensions and 
social transfers 20 15 18 16
Risk reduction 17 25 22 27
Source: CSO, 00: Table 4. and CSO, 00: Table 4.4, p. 4.
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income poverty, (the poverty rate after taxes and transfers 
are factored into income). Seven western European countries 
plus the US and Canada are compared at dates from 99 to 
000. The Irish data are for 000, the height of the boom. 
This finds that market income poverty in Ireland at 4.9% is 
below the average of %, reflecting a tight labour market. 
Ireland’s post-transfer poverty, on the other hand, is second 
highest at .%, well above the average of 0.% and only 
just behind the US at %. The authors comment that, 
‘detailed analysis shows that higher levels of government 
spending (as in Scandinavia and Northern Europe) and more 
careful targeting of government transfers on the poor (as in 
Canada, Sweden and Finland) produce lower poverty rates’ 
(Smeeding and Nolan, 004: -).
How effective then is the current two-tier welfare state in 
reducing poverty? The principal focus in answering this 
question has been on the adequacy of welfare payments 
for those in poverty. For example, O’Donoghue traced 
Irish replacement rates from 9 to 00. In other words, 
the ratio of the value of welfare payments to average 
earnings, finding that for single people it was ‘quite low 
by European standards’ fluctuating between  and 0% 
for most of this period. For a married couple with two 
children, the rate moved from .% in 98 to .4% in 
00 (O’Donoghue, 00: 49 and Table 4). Over a shorter 
time period, Walsh traced minimum welfare rates and the 
level of the state pension as a percentage of 0% of median 
income from 994 to 00, as shown in Table  above. 
These data would indicate that the recent improvement 
in welfare rates in Ireland is still insufficient to reduce the 
country’s risk of poverty. Walsh, however, believes that 
the intensification of the poverty impact of fiscal policies 
‘may take some time to work its way into EU comparisons’ 
(Walsh, 00: ). Significantly, in a study of what it would 
take to emulate in Ireland the success of the Danish and 
Dutch welfare systems in reducing poverty, Callan et al. 
found that the differences in poverty outcomes between 
Ireland and those two continental countries could not 
be explained by differences in age profile, pattern of 
labour force participation and household composition 
but rather by levels of welfare effort. They estimated that 
the standard and top rates of Irish income tax would have 
to be raised by  percentage points (to % and % 
respectively, based on the then Irish rates) for Ireland 
to afford Danish and Dutch levels (Callan et al., 004). 
Other work by Callan suggests that if the state were to 
redistribute state investment in pensions by, for example, 
standard rating the very regressive pensions tax reliefs; it 
would be possible to eliminate the risk of relative income 
poverty for all of Ireland’s pension-aged population.
e) Public services:
As average spending on social protection as a percentage 
of GDP remained steady throughout the EU in the 990s, 
the Irish ratio began to fall so that its social spending by 
000 was by far the lowest in the EU- when measured as a 
percentage of GDP/GNP. Eurostat figures show that, in 00, 
Ireland’s overall spending on social protection, at 9.% of 
its GNP (or .9% of its GDP) was well below the EU average 
of .4% and the lowest of the EU-. Indeed, it was lower 
than Slovenia, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic and 
on a par with Slovakia. Health and education spending, as a 
percentage of GNP, were almost exactly the EU GDP average.
Health
More attention over this period was focused on the health 
service than any other public service, and particularly 
on the crisis in many Accident and Emergency units of 
major Irish hospitals which found themselves unable 
to cope with the demands being placed on them. Non-
In social policy, the early 000s have 
not seen any significant reforms. Rather, 
the principal change has been a certain 
reversal of the state’s weakening welfare 
effort at the height of the boom. 
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capital spending on health increased from €.4 billion in 
000 to €0. billion in 00, an increase from % to % 
of GNP. However, the poor quality of the health services 
remained a major topic of public debate and dominated 
the 00 general election campaign. As Layte et al. (00) 
conclude: ‘Activity in the acute hospital sector has risen 
substantially but that system is clearly under severe strain, 
while primary care services have not been expanded as 
rapidly as intended […] Equity of access remains a key 
concern, both in terms of the affordability of GP services 
and the two-tier access to hospitals associated with the 
unique Irish mix of public and private health care’ (Layte 
et al., 00: ). Health expenditure in the mid 990s was 
.% of GDP and is now .%. The EU average is 8.%, while 
France spends 0.4%, Denmark 8.9% and Norway 0.%. 
 
Ireland has undertaken increased privatisation of  
Health Care and building for-profit hospitals and nursing 
homes, so that there is clear evidence of a social class and 
income-divided health system – the poor are simply more 
likely to die younger than the better off. Those with no 
formal educational qualifications are 0% less likely to  
have excellent or very good health compared with those  
who have had third-level education. For example, only  
40% of people on very low incomes (€ ,000 or less) had 
very good health compared with 8% of those who had  
four times or more of their income (€,000 or more) 
(Institute of Public Health, 00: 9).
Education
The 00 OECD report on education shows Ireland’s GNP 
share spent on education was .% compared to an EU 
average of .%. However, given that Ireland has a relatively 
young population and hence proportionately more people 
in education, it needs to reach the spend more typical 
in most rich OECD countries, of around % of national 
output. As groups like the St. Vincent de Paul Society and 
the Teachers Union of Ireland have repeatedly pointed out, 
parents subsidise education and, where parents cannot 
pay, children suffer. Children of higher professionals are 
more than . times as likely to get 4+ grade Cs on Higher 
Level Leaving Certificate papers than are the children of 
the unemployed, and two times more likely to get these 
grades than the children of lower grade non-manual 
workers. Just 0% of boys and % of girls in households 
where the parents are unemployed complete education to 
the Leaving Certificate compared with almost 90% of the 
children of employer/manager and professional groups 
(Gorky, McCoy and Watson, 00, Table .c). There is a 
lack of national data on all the main equality grounds 
and on social class in relation to educational attainment 
and progress, leading to a further denial of inequality 
by failing to fund research on levels of inequality.
Housing
Housing is increasingly defined by government policy 
and popular discourse as an investment ‘Property’ not a 
‘Right’ and there has been a steady decline in investment 
in public/local authority housing since 00. This has 
not been matched by any significant increase in other 
forms of social or voluntary housing. The number of local 
authority (LA) houses built in 00 is roughly the same 
as in 00 despite the significant increase in population 
as detailed in Table 8. Social housing has declined 
significantly as a proportion of total housing stock.
Table 8: Local authority and social housing, 2003-06
Year LA housing: built LAHousing: acquired Social/voluntary housing 
Total dwellings
Total dwellings (LA, Social/
Voluntary and private)
2003 4, 4 , 8,89
2004 ,9 9 ,0 ,94
2005 4,409 98 ,0 80,9
2006 ,98 , ,40 9,49
Source: Table 8. CSO Report Measuring Ireland’s Progress (00.)
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The most recent articulation of Ireland’s socio-economic 
development model is found in the 00 NESC report on 
the Developmental Welfare State. This conceptualises 
a new approach to welfare policy that promotes a more 
active social policy and participation in economic and 
social life. It utilises the concept of a ‘developmental 
welfare state’ (DWS) with three overlapping domains of 
welfare state activity: core services, income supports 
and activist measures. It also conceptualises a life-cycle 
approach which assesses the different risk and hazards 
people face at different stages of the life cycle and 
differentiates the necessary supports at four different 
stages of their life cycle – children, working aged, older 
people and people who cannot live autonomously (NESC 
00: ). The life-cycle approach can be an effective way 
to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of overall social 
protection only if it is able to account for the diversity 
of people within the different stages of the life cycle.
Life-cycle approach: 
At first glance, the life-cycle approach is a useful one. By 
differentiating stages of life it brings a conceptual clarity to 
how much of social policy, and particularly social welfare, 
is presently organised to support groups at different stages 
of the life cycle. Further, it gives visibility to key groups 
of people less likely to be prioritised in an economic and 
productivist order, namely those groups most distant from 
the labour market and most at risk of poverty. This gives 
the representative disability organisations and groups 
working on behalf of older people stronger voice and policy 
relevance. The reverse is also true however, and other groups 
particularly women, lone parents and migrants become 
hidden in the category ‘working aged’. A life-cycle approach 
cannot see each stage of the life cycle as separate from the 
previous stage. Rather, it must recognise that disadvantage 
happens cumulatively over a life cycle and that poverty in 
early life stages leads to poverty in later life stages. 
Gender is probably the most significant inequality weakness 
of the DWS. The life-cycle approach, while explicitly 
engaging with the two major inequality grounds of age and 
disability, is completely gender blind. This, combined with 
the fact that this gender inequality ground incorporates over 
0% of the population, is a major structural fault. The life-
cycle approach does not necessarily recognise that women’s 
lives are characterised by gender inequalities that lead to 
cumulative disadvantage across the life-cycle stages of 
childhood, working age and old age, nor does it gender the 
care implications of disability. 
Sweeney’s argument (00: ) that it is 
better to focus ‘more deliberately on what 
people have in common than on differences 
between them’ ignores the fact that 0% 
of the population are significantly different 
to the other 0% of the population, so that 
such a gender-blind life cycle will result in 
gender-blind policy rather than approaches 
that mainstream gender. 
The gender dimension and the absence of a care analysis 
are most troubling. From its starting point, the DWS fails to 
recognise and consider systematically the implications of 
the Irish male breadwinner approach to structural features 
in our social and economic systems. For example, it does 
not consider the issue of individual entitlement or economic 
autonomy. The category of the ‘working aged’ defines all 
adults by their employment status so that the life-cycle 
approach is ultimately centered around attachment to 
the labour market. It implicitly (and explicitly) promotes 
participation in paid employment in a predominately 
‘adult worker model’ where social exclusion is defined 
The life-cycle approach can be an effective 
way to assess the adequacy and effectiveness 
of overall social protection only if it is able to 
account for the diversity of people within the 
different stages of the life cycle.
––
predominantly as exclusion from the labour market (NESC 
00: 9). Within the category of working aged, work is 
clearly implied to mean waged work and the issue of unpaid 
work and its interrelationship with the waged economy is 
not included in the discussion. This labour-market approach 
is reinforced by the assertion in the National Action Plan 
for Social Inclusion that ‘every person of working age 
should have an opportunity to balance work and family 
commitments consistent with business needs’ (Ireland 00: 
40). In the interests of gender equality a broader approach 
to social inclusion is required which recognises that social 
inclusion cannot be based only on getting people into 
the labour market and market-based work. It must also 
recognise the other social obligations within families and 
communities, the wider context in which people live and the 
autonomy people need to shape their own life experiences. 
Policy requires a fundamental shift to transform 
the welfare state into one which recognises 
women and men as equal and that all forms of 
work, paid and unpaid, make an equally valuable 
contribution (Lynch, 2007). 
In order to apply an effective gender mainstreaming 
strategy and bring a cohesive gender equality dimension 
to the lifecycle a new approach is required to cope with 
complexities of women’s and men’s lives, and to recognise 
how paid employment is but one element of those lives. 
Rather, the problem is that the current emphasis on paid 
work overshadows care; interdependency is made the poor 
relation of economic self-sufficiency, and educational 
achievement dominates approaches to child wellbeing. This 
means developing and implementing policies that provide 
time, space and financial security for people to balance their 
work and care responsibilities, including the provision of 
childcare and eldercare infrastructure as essential public 
rather than private services. 
The same logic can be applied to other key life-
differentiating characteristics of ethnicity and disability. For 
example, the NESC’s DWS does not recognise the cumulative 
impact of exclusion from education and then from working 
life for people with disabilities or for asylum seekers who are 
denied the right to work. While it is accepted that these key 
groups are been better incorporated into the model, there 
are dangers that in differentiating them so strongly from 
general populations their needs will be treated in a targeted 
rather than a mainstream way. A current example of this 
is the social profile of working age people produced by the 
Office for Social Inclusion (OSI) which contains absolutely 
no reference to people with disabilities. Social identities 
and social problems are socially constructed and there are 
dangers in the life-cycle approach of socially constructing 
some groups of people as living in a world apart. 
The life-cycle approach advocates treating people on 
the basis of their individual needs so as to provide more 
appropriate responses at specific stages of the life cycle. 
While many of the arguments put forward by 
the DWS are positive in terms of the targeting of 
services appropriately to meet the various needs 
of the individual, there also needs to be space 
within the policy arena to address the inequalities 
collectively experienced by groups in our society. 
NESC argues the ‘services dividend’ of the DWS will result 
in services which play ‘a significant role in strengthening 
social cohesion, constituting public spaces where people 
are citizens first and only secondly belong to different social 
classes, ethnic minorities, neighbourhoods, etc’. (NESC, 
00: ). This approach does not recognise the complexity 
of discrimination that individuals experience on the basis 
of their group identity. Arguments about the need to 
account for discrimination on the basis of group identity are 
different to arguments for gender mainstreaming. Here we 
are differentiating a type of discrimination which arises in 
the context of membership of a particular ‘group’ and where 
being identified with that group, rather than a person’s 
individual characteristics, is central to understanding the 
nature of the person’s and group’s inequality, and the policy 
measures which are required in order to address them. This 
is especially the case if the concept of equality is interpreted 
in a wider sense than material inequality, and embraces 
concepts of respect, representation and affective equality 
(Lynch and Baker, 00). 
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It is worth noting that the NESF (004) adopted such a wide 
interpretation of equality  and it is arguable that the DWS, 
in underplaying the other dimensions of equality, focuses 
too narrowly on income inequality and ignores recognition, 
respect and representation inequalities. This means it fails 
to recognise a core principle in the NAPs and NAPSincl, 
that both poverty and inequality are multidimensional 
in nature and that the impact of this multidimensional 
process of inequality has to be understood in making 
policy to eradicate them. The DWS can be interpreted as 
a classical Liberal Equal Opportunities perspective that 
seeks equal formal rights so as to mitigate discrimination 
in terms of access to and participation within services 
(Lynch and Baker, 00). The limitations of this approach 
to rights are that it advantages the relatively advantaged 
among the disadvantaged. It leads not to the elimination 
of inequalities but to inequalities being distributed 
differently across groups. It therefore individualises the 
problem of inequality to be a personal pathology. It does 
not seek to eliminate substantive inequalities of wealth, 
power, status and care that produce the inequalities 
of opportunity in the first instance and that reproduce 
inequalities anew in each new generation. Thus constant 
re-allocations and re-designations of structural inequality 
of opportunity are required as inequalities are reproduced 
anew, often leading to a backlash within states against 
marginalised groups. This approach perpetuates the myth 
that it is possible to have equality of opportunity without 
equality of condition. International evidence, however, 
is overwhelming that the more unequal a society is 
economically, the more unequal it is educationally, socially 
and in health terms, leading to the conclusion that there 
can be no meaningful equality of opportunity without 
equality of condition or without eliminating hierarchies of 
wealth, power and privilege so that everyone has roughly 
equal prospects for a good life. The NESC DWS discussion 
could be strengthened towards equality of condition 
outcomes by reframing it in a more multidimensional 
rights context such as a ‘Rs development framework’. 
6 Rs Development Framework: 
 
Rights, Responsibilities, Redistribution, Respect, Representation, Recognition
 A framework for equality has to be based on a broader concept of equality (and citizenship) that involves not just equality of opportunity
but equality of economic, political, cultural and affective conditions. This needs to include the following dimensions: Economic Equality 
- equality of resources equality of opportunity requires equality of economic conditions; Socio-cultural Equality - equality of respect 
and recognition for the different status groups; Political Equality - equality of power in public and private institutions, the politics of 
presence and voice; and Affective Equality - equality in the doing of care work and equal access to love, care and solidarity.
While the DWS focus on the needs of the individual and 
the organisation of services to meet ‘individual’ needs in a 
tailored way has significant merits, it does raise challenges 
from an equality perspective, in relation to addressing the 
structural inequalities which are experienced by groups in 
our society. Groups vary in how they are affected by different 
forms of inequality. Lynch and Lyons (008) argue that in a 
neo-liberal model of citizenship where the market values 
define cultural values, the citizen is defined as a rational 
economic maximiser, a ‘consumer’. This promotes a lack 
of social solidarity for those more vulnerable than oneself, 
a privatisation of interest and a fixation with measuring 
success in quantitative terms – performance management, 
performance appraisal, and performance targets.
The NESC DWS discussion could be 
strengthened towards equality of 
condition outcomes by reframing it in  
a more multidimensional rights context 
such as a ‘Rs development framework’
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Sweeney (00: ) argues against exclusionary group 
approaches to social inclusion policy on the grounds 
that such approaches tend to reinforce disadvantage, 
militate against high standards and take the focus off the 
need to change mainstream services to better cope with 
diversity. There is the danger, however, that in arguing 
for individualised approaches, one might throw the 
baby out with the bath water and under-appreciate the 
role discrimination plays in unequal access to services 
and resources. Seeking to reduce the salience of ‘group’ 
identities to create overarching identities could be as much 
a political strategy to minimise the politics of inequality 
as a service delivery strategy to minimise stigma (NCCRI, 
004). The outcomes of services and programmes, and the 
methods in which they are delivered, must also recognise 
the past and present experiences of discrimination for 
groups in our society. NESC argues that the DWS ‘builds 
on tolerance, a welcome for diversity, a commitment to 
equality and respect for the individual’; however, it proposes 
no methodology or approach to integrate equality into 
the life-cycle approach. There is a danger in adopting a 
minimalist proofing style mechanism to each of the nine 
equality grounds that will reinforce rather than challenge 
structural inequalities and discrimination. Clearly there is a 
need to further explore how an individual approach to the 
delivery of services can be integrated with an understanding 
of structural inequality across the nine grounds. This failure 
to conceptualise distributional justice and recognition or 
identity justice as two sides of the same coin will undermine 
attempts to reduce either.
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b) Overlapping areas of welfare  
state activity:
Figure 1 DWS - overlapping areas of activity, 
services, income and local activist services
PUBLIC
SERVICES
INCOME
SUPPORTS
ACTIVIST
MEASURES
The diagram above represents how the DWS is understood 
to comprise three overlapping areas of activity, services, 
income and local activist services. It can be seen in the 
diagram that the DWS places most emphasis on the 
provision of core public services and sees these as the 
most strategic area for investment. Women, the poor, and 
others experiencing disadvantage are more direct users of 
these services. The emphasis in the DWS on the provision 
of public services which are accessible and of high quality 
is a critical element of the proposal for achieving equality 
and is therefore most welcome. However, it is difficult 
to reconcile the ambition of the DWS with the reality of 
the development of public services in Ireland since 00. 
Cousins (00:99) observes ‘that it in the critical area of 
services the NAPS inclusion is lacking any fundamental 
reappraisal’. He concludes it is far from clear that the NESC’s 
central message on services ‘has been taken on board in 
recent policy agreements and strategies’. 
Taking two prime areas, health and childcare, 
it is evident that Irish policy is moving towards 
market-based provision where affordability in 
the market becomes the criteria for access, the 
opposite of tailored universalism. 
This is an important limitation as, without full investment 
in core public services accessible to all, a fundamental part 
of the DSW will not materialise and it is women and the 
poor or disadvantaged who will most acutely experience the 
impact of the lack of investment in such services. 
The second domain refers to the range of income support 
measures which should provide adequate subsistence and 
enable participation in society. Differentiated on life stages 
the DWS model envisages particular emphasis on income 
support for children and the elderly for example. A focus on 
pensions has a particular equality dimension, as those who 
suffer greatest disadvantage in the working stage of the life 
cycle are at greatest risk of pensioner poverty and have most 
to benefit from investment in pensions. The option favoured 
in the DWS, a universal pension, has much merit on 
gender grounds. It is less clear however that this vision has 
informed the options laid out for public consultation in the 
00 Green Paper on Pensions, which appears to place more 
emphasis on private than on public responses to future 
pension provision. The DWS favours a mechanism for child 
income support that is irrelevant of the parent’s status but 
that can also target, ‘While all children are supported, some 
are supported more than others’ (00:). While such a 
mechanism would be welcome there is again little evidence 
that it is a policy priority of either government or the social 
partners (Cousins, 00).
 
The DWS links increasing welfare incomes with the issue of 
work incentives. Its proposals for more adequate welfare 
are linked to proposals to make income support for people 
of working age more conditional on employment or other 
social activities. This significant activation proposal which 
has substantial gender implications (see Lister, 004; 
Levitas, 00; Murphy, 008) is consistent with social policy 
development elsewhere. The DWS discussion of activation 
takes place in the broader concept of flexicurity (NESC, 00: 
9). Flexicurity is a policy that seeks to enhance the flexibility 
of the labour markets, work organisation and labour 
relations as well as employment security and social security 
(Kester, 00). The European Commission (00) defines 
flexicurity as an integrated strategy to enhance, at the same 
time, flexibility and security. 
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Its components include flexible and reliable contractual 
arrangements, lifelong learning strategies, effective active 
labour market policies and modern social security systems. 
In practice there are three legs to flexicurity policy in a 
welfare state - flexible labour law, active labour market 
policy and generous welfare and public services. Ireland 
already has a highly deregulated and flexible labour market 
and significant activation with relatively high levels of 
investment in Irish active labour market programmes. With 
regard to the third leg of the flexicurity stool, generous 
welfare and public services, while the DWS envisages quality 
core public services and generous income support there 
are no practical commitments in policy statements to such 
a vision of a welfare state (Cousins, 00). Rather public 
services remain inadequate and income supports are too 
low to lift people from poverty. Both require significant 
investment to reach levels of social security envisaged in the 
EU understanding of flexicurity policy. There will be income 
adequacy implications, especially for the working aged 
population, when the level of public services theoretically 
implied in the DWS fails to materialise in practice. Having 
to pay for market-based childcare, for example, impacts 
on the already inadequate income of lone parents. The 
theoretical trade-off between activation and more generous 
income supports offered by DWS is not, in reality, on offer 
from the Irish state. Callan (00) highlights the lack of 
generosity of Irish social security rates. While there may 
be an overall aspiration towards having ‘high replacement 
rates’, the actual recommendations for income adequacy 
in the DWS are less ambitious. These are that ‘people of 
working age should receive a ‘basic payment’ to enable a 
‘minimum threshold of income adequacy’ to ‘guarantee 
them access to the basic necessities of life’ (NESC, 00: 
9), while the NAPS target of €0 in 00 terms by 00 is 
‘the minimum justified by the present circumstances’. This 
lack of advancement of an adequacy agenda in the DWS is a 
significant weakness.
The third platform of the Developmental Welfare State is 
comprised of innovative pro-active measures in which non-
governmental organisations respond to unmet social needs. 
The DWS envisages local community and voluntary sector 
organisations, funded by state agencies, providing services 
to communities and population sub-groups with specific 
needs left unaddressed by mainstream services (NESC, 
00: -8). This third platform has significant gender and 
equality implications. Poorer people disproportionately 
depend on this sector for services and employment so that 
wages and terms and conditions of employment in this 
sector will be an important determinant of well being in 
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It is less clear, however, that this vision has informed the 
options laid out for public consultation in the 00 Green 
Paper on Pensions, which appears to place more emphasis on 
private than on public responses to future pension provision.
A focus on pensions has a particular equality 
dimension, as those who suffer greatest 
disadvantage in the working stage of the life cycle 
are at greatest risk of pensioner poverty and have 
most to benefit from investment in pensions. The 
option favoured in the DWS, a universal pension, 
has much merit on gender grounds.
A BETTER IRELAND IS POSSIBLE–0–
poor communities. Women as mothers and carers with more 
dependency on social services, will disproportionately access 
these local projects and the quality of the services will have 
a disproportionate impact on women’s wellbeing. There is 
also the question of sustainability – while employed people 
can and do play a key role in management committees, 
there is still the issue of whether women and working-
aged people more generally can continue the unpaid 
management committee role within local-level civil society 
in the context of greater employment participation. This is 
not examined by the authors of the DWS. 
While mainstream services are theoretically provided by 
tailored universalism, it is clear in discussing who should 
provide these targeted services that there are significant 
expectations about the service delivery role of community 
and voluntary sector organisations. Some pragmatically 
welcome such a move and the principle of diversity of 
provision. Others interpret the expansion of the social 
innovation role expected of the community and voluntary 
sector as an implicit desire to introduce a new regulatory 
and funding environment for service delivery contracts. 
For some this represents downgrading the role of the 
state. Others are wary of the effect of directing the work of 
local organisations away from campaigning, lobbying and 
representational work of civil society. Harvey (008), and 
campaigning documents from within the sector (Changing 
Ireland, 008), confirm what many suspect – that behind 
the innocent intention of the ‘local activist networks 
sphere’ lies a more sinister agenda of restructuring civil 
space (Geoghegan and Powell 00). The experience of the 
00-00 local development cohesion process suggests a 
mutual atmosphere of mistrust between the state and civil 
society in which reform will be difficult. Harvey (008) writes 
that recently the voluntary-statutory interface has become 
a ‘highly contested political space’ and especially so since 
the 00 reconfiguration by the state of that voluntary-
statutory relationship in the shape of the Department of 
Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs. Harvey identifies 
a number of structural reforms that together suggest a 
danger zone for an independent civil society. These include 
the prohibition of advocacy within new communities’ 
funding programmes and by childcare networks, the 
requirement of external endorsement for the plans of 
community development projects, (Bon 00), discouraging 
the role of policy officers, threats to review organisations 
that speak out (Harvey mentions Trócaire and Pavee Point), 
the lack of consultation on significant funding changes 
in 00 and a discernible funding shift toward service 
providing organisations. While the state has substantially 
increased its funding to the local activist sphere and 
social innovators, the price paid may be subservience 
and dependence and an unhealthy asphyxiating circle 
for voluntary and community activity. Harvey urges 
that ways be found to break out of this scenario. 
Despite the above cautionary tales, the DWS is still a starting 
point for an alternative model of development. However the 
DWS exists in the context of the weaknesses and structural 
inadequacies of the overall Irish model of development. 
These weaknesses inform the constraints and boundaries in 
implementing the more positive features identified in the 
NESC DWS. To date, there is little evidence that the state has 
internalised the core positive principles informing the logic 
of such a Development Welfare State into income supports, 
public services, or local innovative activist organisations. 
There is a contradiction between the rhetoric 
of such documents as Towards 2016 (T16) and 
NAPinclusion which affirm the Developmental 
Welfare State, on the one hand, and the 
market-led approach of the state to core public 
services like health or child and elder care and 
privatisation, on the other. 
This affirms the conclusion of the previous discussion 
that the logic of competition rather than welfare is firmly 
driving Irish development. It is to an alternative model of 
development that we must now turn.
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Economic choices and expenditure decisions made  
by government impact directly on people’s lives. These 
choices determine the quality and quantity of public 
services and the amount to be spent on education, 
health, housing, transport and social welfare.  
How the government chooses to manage the economy, 
however, will be influenced by the amount of resources 
available to it. If the government aims, for example, to 
work for significant reductions in poverty it will require 
consistent economic growth to carry out this task. Likewise, 
the capacity of the political system to implement rights is 
dependent on economic resources. On the other hand, a 
certain level of equality and social cohesion is necessary for 
economic growth.
If people are trapped by poverty and unable to 
participate in the economy, this is a loss not only 
for them personally but also for society and the 
economy as a whole. 
Social expenditure can therefore be considered as an 
investment in the economy. As Kenworthy (00) argues, 
income equality is possible in modern capitalism and 
it helps rather than hurts the economy. In line with the 
conclusion of the National Competitiveness Council (NCC) 
report on Wellbeing and Competitiveness there is no 
necessary trade-off between growth and equality. Both 
are necessary. Both reinforce the other and are mutually 
dependent on each other. This section explores a framework 
for understanding alternative analysis for development and 
points to international examples where alternative economic 
and social models are viable policy models which result in 
better social outcomes. It draws on varieties of capitalism 
literature, welfare regime literature and Sapir’s models of 
development which differentiates a state’s economic and 
social outcomes according to levels of equity and efficiency.
The central message is that there are models of development 
which are compatible with both growth and equity and 
can realise strong social outcomes while maintaining and 
reinforcing competitiveness. 
Finland is offered as an example of a small state which 
has achieved such a sustainable model of development. 
While not possible in this paper, it would be useful to learn 
more about the Finnish or other small successful state’s 
development processes. 
However it is important to enter some caveats. Every 
country experiences its own path dependant growth where 
historically unique decisions and events carve the initial 
shape and subsequent development of each nation’s 
institutions and policies. There are, therefore, serious 
limits to what policy learning can be simply transferred 
from one country to another. Development is not only a 
matter of political choice; there are other resource, skills, 
institutional capacity, geographic and historical contexts to 
be considered. Typologies of models of development below 
are limited in that they represent simple realities. The social 
and economic reality of any country is far more complex, 
ambiguous and differentiated than a simple picture 
suggests. Migrants, for example, will not experience the level 
of equality suggested in the Nordic model of development. 
For all of these reasons a discussion of models  
of development has to be taken at a conceptual 
level and used to help ‘turn the boat in the 
direction of travel’ rather than provide a road  
map for the journey.
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a) Defining development:
One of the first challenges in defining or adopting 
a model of development is to be clear about what 
is meant by development, whether we simply 
mean economic growth or whether we mean a 
wider definition of national wellbeing. 
As NCC (008) argues, in the present Irish model of 
development we tend to define development as economic 
growth and use the Irish level of GDP (a measurement of the 
total value of traded goods and services produced in Ireland) 
as a measurement of development. However this is limited 
and misleading for the following reasons. It says nothing 
about whether growth is sustainable, that is, if it can look 
after the needs of today without jeopardising the needs 
of future generations. It says nothing about how national 
income is distributed between regions, social classes, men 
and women, age groups or ethnic groups. It does not include 
any assessment of the value of unpaid work, including care 
work done by women. It places positive value on activities 
that actually harm the environment (e.g. driving motor cars) 
and places less value on constructive activities that sustain 
the environment (e.g. cycling). Finally it includes the value of 
profits made in Ireland but transferred abroad. 
There are other, alternative, forms of measurement that  
CP might wish to consider:
• The UN Human Development Index (HDI) measures life 
expectancy, literacy, and income above the poverty level; 
the Gender-Related Development Index adds gender 
inequality (hdr.undp.org)
• The GPI Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) uses  
 social,economic and environmental indicators  
 to measure progress (www.unpac.ca.)
• The Irish Central Statistics Office, in Measuring Ireland’s  
 Progress, reports annually on a wide range of social and  
 economic indicators (www.cso.ie).
From a poverty perspective, economic growth is most useful 
if it provides resources that are used to promote wellbeing. 
Some economic growth can bring employment, improved 
standards of living, better infrastructure and public services. 
However, resources generated by growth are not always 
used for maximising public welfare. They can, for example, 
be given to the rich in tax breaks. The benefits of growth 
have to outweigh the costs incurred in pursuing economic 
growth. The costs can include environmental damage from 
construction, chemicals and motorways; wastage of very 
finite resources; greater inequality; and problems associated 
with urban expansion, crime and vandalism. Growth can 
impact more harshly on some sectors of the population 
than on others. Women, for example, were increasingly 
carrying the double burden of care and work in the fast-
growing Irish economy during the boom years. There are 
some types of economic growth which should be avoided 
because of their negative effects such as jobless growth (no 
employment), ruthless growth (going only to the rich), voiceless 
growth (little democratic growth or individual empowerment), 
rootless growth (community/cultural identity diminishes) and 
futureless growth (resources of future generations are used up).
b) The importance of values:
The first thing to do then is adopt a definition and 
measurement of sustainable human development. 
This is likely to be a complex definition with numerous 
measurements and requires that the values underpinning 
such an alternative definition are made clear and those that 
inform the dominant model of development are challenged. 
Ireland’s dominant model of development 
currently rests on values of individualism, 
income maximisation and economic growth 
as an end in itself rather than as a means to 
social development, and the domination of the 
policy-making process by a narrow political and 
economic elite. 
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An alternative model will require values of social solidarity 
taking priority, economic growth being seen as a means to 
sustainable and equitable social development especially 
for the poorest and most vulnerable in our society, and 
the broadening of decision-making processes to include 
a much wider range of stakeholders (as evidenced by 
the participatory budgetary processes now common 
throughout Latin America). A final and very important 
consideration is to challenge the current dominant model 
that gives priority to issues of efficiency in favour of an 
alternative model that seeks to balance efficiency with 
a concern for equity. Scharpf and Schmidt (00) argue 
that the type of public discourse about these values is an 
important dimension of promoting an alternative model 
of development and building support for it. Discourse can 
be closed, exclusive and co-ordinative or open inclusive 
and communicative. This process of creating values 
through open public discourse is a core part of a model of 
development and is discussed further later in this section.
c) There is no necessary tradeoff between 
growth and equality:
The next stage is to develop a model of development 
that promotes both growth and equality. While nearly all 
economies are mixed capitalist economies, there are great 
differences between them. Some varieties of capitalism 
create less poverty and inequality than others. Sapir (00) 
differentiated countries to the degree that they were 
efficient and equitable, or competitive and fair. Table 0 
illustrates that if you live in certain places you are less likely 
to be poor and more likely to enjoy equality.
There are clear links between the variety of capitalism a 
country chooses and the extent of poverty and inequality 
it experiences. For example, there is a proven link between 
high social spending and achieving equality (Timenon, 00) 
so a model of development with high social expenditure 
is likely to be good for equality. One of the reasons the 
Nordic countries are more equal is that their governments 
provide universal services that are accessible to all. Because 
everyone uses them, and because they are high quality, 
citizens are more willing to pay the high taxes required  
to fund the services. 
A key debate for Ireland is whether citizens are  
willing to pay more taxes to fund higher and 
better social services like health and education. 
This would be necessary to pursue policies that will elevate 
Ireland to the top right quadrant. This, of course, is a 
question of values.
Table 10: Balancing growth and equity
Uncompetitive/inefficient Very competitive/efficient
Equality
Box 1:  
Countries that are not very competitive but 
have equality Continental countries: Belgium, 
Germany, France, Luxembourg
Box 2:  
Countries that are very competitive and have 
equality Nordic countries: Denmark, Sweden, 
Finland, The Netherlands, Austria
Inequality
Box 3:  
Countries that are not very competitive and 
have high inequality Mediterranean countries: 
Spain, Greece, Italy
Box 4:  
Countries that are very competitive but have 
inequality Anglo-Saxon countries: UK, Ireland, 
Portugal
Source: Andre Sapir, 2005.
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4) Varieties of capitalism:
Another approach to analysing different models of 
development in today’s world that has become influential 
over recent years comes from the Varieties of Capitalism 
literature (Table ).
Situating Ireland in this context, it emerges clearly as a 
Liberal Market Economy (LME) which has achieved high 
levels of economic and employment growth since 98 
but at the cost of growing relative poverty and high levels 
of income inequality, and with a liberal regime in the 
sphere of labour relations (Hall and Soskice, 00: -). 
However, what creates a certain puzzle about the Irish 
case is that, at least since the late 980s, it has developed 
some of the coordinative mechanisms such as corporativist 
arrangements between the state and social partners that are 
more associated with the Coordinated Market Economies 
(CMEs). This has led some analysts to speak of Ireland 
as ‘a new and developing form of governance’ (Taylor, 
00: 4) or, as seems to be the case among policy makers 
internationally, a new model of successful development 
for the era of globalisation. However, instead of fostering a 
greater tradeoff between growth and equity which is what 
these mechanisms have traditionally been seen as doing, 
Ireland’s extensive social partnership arrangements function 
rather to impose the disciplines of a competitive market 
Table 11: Varieties of capitalism
Liberal market 
economies (LMEs)
Coordinated market 
economies (CMEs)
Australia
New Zealand
Canada
UK
Ireland
US
Austria
Japan
Belgium
Netherlands
Denmark
Norway
Finland
Sweden
Iceland
Switzerland
Germany
Source: Hall and Soskice, 2001: 20.
economy on society and to draw in the trade unions and the 
community and voluntary sector to make their activities 
compatible with a strongly market-oriented approach to 
policy and to make them even more dependent on the state. 
Another factor that marks Ireland out as distinctive in 
the context of the varieties of capitalism literature is its 
very heavy dependence on foreign companies which have 
provided its growth dynamic over the course of the Celtic 
Tiger period and which still dominate the cutting-edge 
export sectors of the economy. In this regard, therefore, 
the comparative institutional advantage built by the Irish 
state is based on a strong orientation towards attracting 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and it is this feature which 
conditions the strategic interactions between the state 
and firms, the state and domestic actors, and the state and 
the European Union (EU). For example, the Irish state has 
opposed trenchantly any attempt to co-ordinate taxation 
systems within the EU, fearing it will result in common 
tax regimes for corporations and therefore undercut the 
comparative advantage Ireland has built up through its low 
corporation-tax regime. Ireland’s high level of dependence 
on US firms, therefore, severely limits the room for 
manoeuvre of the Irish political economy even if the Irish 
state were interested in adopting the more co-coordinative 
or collaborative approach that characterises the CMEs. The 
leading US firms operating in Ireland depend much more 
on sources of capital in the United States and on innovative 
capacity developed there.  The collaborative relations they 
maintain with Irish firms tend to be of the outsourcing 
variety rather than the dense collaborative networks that 
characterise the CMEs. Finally, Ireland has shown little 
awareness of the economic benefits to be achieved from 
generous investment in social benefits, such as replacement 
rates for the unemployed or pensions for the retired, which 
again characterise the CMEs. Far from constituting a new 
political economy model therefore, Ireland emerges as a 
particular type of LME highly dependent on foreign firms. 
Social partnership has been used to reinforce this model 
and to argue for acceptance of the inequality associated the 
model rather then, as in CMEs, to act as a political forum to 
negotiate and win acceptance for the policy mix required to  
reduce market inequalities.
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5) Welfare Regimes:
Hall and Soskice note a correspondence between types of 
political economies and types of welfare states. They write 
that ‘virtually all liberal market economies are accompanied 
by “liberal” welfare states, whose emphasis on means-
testing and low levels of benefits reinforce the fluid labour 
markets that firms use to manage their relations with 
labour’ (Hall and Soskice, 00: 0-). Much discussion has 
taken place about where Ireland stands in the typology 
developed by Esping-Andersen (990). 
Esping-Andersen places Ireland as part of the Anglo-Saxon 
nations together with Australia, the US, New Zealand, 
Canada and the UK. Despite valid criticisms of Esping-
Andersen’s typology, however, there is a widespread 
recognition in the Irish literature that Ireland is closest to 
the liberal model and has many features associated with 
a liberal, residual or Anglo-Saxon welfare regime.4 These 
include a Poor Law legacy of ‘less eligibility’ or keeping 
social welfare payments below the lowest unskilled wage, 
ungenerous social welfare payments associated with 
4 Cousins points out that subsequent references to Ireland in later chapters of the book place it in different clusters and he comments:
‘The Irish welfare state is obviously a very moveable feast but not one which Esping-Andersen attempted to digest’ (Cousins, 00: 0). 
Cousins finds Esping-Andersen’s typology problematic for a case like Ireland as it pays no attention to post-colonial peripheral countries 
that have been highly dependent in the global political economy. His discussion places Ireland in a group of Atlantic countries as it bears 
similarities to the British welfare state but also to southern European countries like Italy, Spain and Portugal sharing with the latter 
Catholicism and relatively late development (ibid.: -8). O’Shea and Kennelly similarly find problems with Esping-Andersen’s typology 
and suggest that a classification developed by Alber based on two crucial sets of relationships in social care provision, one between 
church and state and the other between centre and periphery, is potentially a much more interesting framework for peripheral, post-
colonial countries like Ireland (O’Shea and Kennelly, 00: -).
 Replacement ratios measure the ratio of income when unemployed to income when in work (Callan et al., 99).
Welfare Regime
Liberal Inequality 
& poverty
Conservative
Insiders/Outsiders
Social Democatic
Equality
low Replacement Ratios (RRs), an exceptionally high 
proportion of means-tested payments (NESC, 00: 98) 
and flat-rate social insurance payments. Even taking 
into account both public and private spending on social 
inclusion, the OECD finds Ireland is a low spender on social 
protection by EU standards (NESC, 00: ). Ireland has 
low levels of social expenditure or transfer effort relative to 
wealth as measured by GNP or GDP. Finally, when evidence 
of welfare outcomes is reviewed Ireland ranks among those 
countries with the highest levels of relative poverty and 
income inequalities in the OECD. Little wonder then that 
many classify Ireland as a liberal welfare regime. Murphy 
and Millar take issue with the NESC document on the 
developmental welfare state since it argues that Ireland 
is a hybrid welfare state. They see this as ‘confusing and 
unhelpful’ since it ‘obscures the reality of a failed welfare 
state, hides the role tax and social welfare policy play in 
growing inequality and treats high levels of relative income 
poverty as less problematic than they really are’ (Murphy 
and Millar, 00: 8). Whatever the difficulties about 
classifying the Irish welfare state, these are certainly the 
characteristics that distinguish it. 
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Conclusion 
There is scope therefore to vary Ireland’s model of 
economic and social development, its variety of 
capitalism or its welfare regime so as to increase 
the likelihood of generating more equal outcomes. 
This can be done in a way that does not threaten 
competitiveness or efficiency. The following principles could 
be used to frame the macroeconomic policy priorities of an 
alternative model of development: 
 
• Sustainable growth, industrial policy  
 and national infrastructure
• Education, training and labour market framework
• Wealth, income distribution and access to employment  
• Commitment to public services and regulation  
 for high standards 
• Gender equality, economic autonomy  
 and an ethic of care
• Equality framework
• Inclusive governance and democratic participation
The role of civil society in creating 
alternative discourses
As mentioned earlier, public discourse about values is a 
key part of the process of agreeing any national model of 
development and Irish social partnership has played a key 
role in orienting the Irish model less towards equality than 
towards competition. These wider relationships between the 
state and various civil society actors, and the institutions 
which underpin these relations, also help to create or 
maintain the common values associated with a model of 
development.  In the last 0 years, the state corporatist 
institutional relations or Irish social partnership has played a 
key role in promoting ‘a shared understanding’ or consensus 
about the Irish model of development.  Community and 
Voluntary organisations in social partnership have according 
to Broderick (00) been caught in the ‘smothering 
embrace’ of the present consensus about the Irish model of 
development and are less able to articulate or perhaps even 
imagine alternatives. 
However, Irish power relations have been described in 
many ways other than corporatist (including patriarchal, 
elitist and pluralist). In the last 0 years, the Irish state 
has also reinvented its relationship with wider civil society 
organisations in the community and voluntary sector. While 
the  publication of the White Paper on Supporting Voluntary 
Activity (000) marked a formal pluralist engagement 
with an independent civil society, Harvey (008) argues 
subsequent events since 00 marked a pulling back by 
a state more willing to punish those who dissent from 
the ‘shared understanding’ about the Irish model of 
development and to control civil society organisations 
through funding and legal requirements that direct civil 
In gender terms Ireland is associated with a strong 
male breadwinner welfare regime with a family-based 
payment, low labour market participation of women 
and a relatively underdeveloped care infrastructure.
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society into service delivery activities and away from a 
political role of articulating alternatives. The Budget 009 
decision to integrate the Combat Poverty Agency into the 
Department of Social and Family Affairs and to abolish 
the National Consultative Committee on Racism and 
Interculturalism is a firm indication of the government’s 
intent to minimise the articulation of alternatives.    
Civil society organisations are often thought of as having  
a relatively autonomous space between the market and 
the state.  Such civil society actors have a crucial role to 
play in influencing the nature of political economy models 
and in ensuring a better tradeoff between efficiency and 
equity considerations. Different models of development 
or varieties of capitalism stress different models of 
power relations between elites, the state and society 
more generally. As the global market economy and the 
nature of the capitalist market changes, so too the state 
and its relationships with civil society changes. Civil 
society actors often play  a powerful role in organising 
counter-discourse or counter movements to dominant 
groups in the state and the market at the same time 
the state, in attempting to manage in a context of 
globalisation, has an interest in developing or harnessing 
a governance relationship with civil society actors. 
There are tensions here between the needs of 
the state to legitimise its governance and the 
vital arena of democratic opposition traditionally 
played by civil society organisations. 
So too, there are traditions within civil society groups as to 
whether integrationist or conflict approaches best meet the 
goals or objectives of those groups. 
The evidence of the past two decades indicates 
that the elites who run the Irish state, dominate 
our main political parties and have access to and 
influence on key policy makers, have prioritised 
efficiency, and paid little other than rhetorical 
attention to goals of equity. 
It is paradoxical indeed that the period which saw the most 
draconian and inegalitarian state fiscal policy was when the 
state had the greatest resources it had ever enjoyed. All of 
this highlights just how little influence social actors have 
had on key state policy through the many fora of social 
partnership. They have been co-opted into an elite-driven 
consensus which has offered no real prospect of achieving a 
greater balance between goals of efficiency and equity in the 
Irish political economy. This is not to argue against social 
partnership. Rather it is to highlight how the Irish experience 
stands in marked contrast to the forms of concertation 
that characterise social democratic polities in which social 
actors (particularly trade unions) achieve real tradeoffs with 
employers. 
Another world is possible. But as Anne Marie Smith  
(998: ) writes, ‘political struggle does nevertheless 
depend in part on the ability to imagine alternative worlds’. 
Geoghegan and Powell also argue that there is potential 
for renewed discourse about alternatives. They write that 
‘while active citizenship in the community sector may have 
largely  been co-opted as a tool of government, it has the 
potential to reflexively reimagine itself as a democratic force 
where active citizens resist the alienating effect of thin 
representative democracy – and build counter discourses’ 
(Geoghegan and Powell, 00: 48). And, let us remember 
that, in the words of Susan George ‘there are a thousand 
alternatives’ (00:8).  
‘political struggle does nevertheless depend in 
part on the ability to imagine alternative worlds’.
Anne Marie Smith (1998: 7)
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Glossary of Terms
Gross Domestic Product
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the total value of all goods and services produced in an economy 
in a given time period, regardless of whether this income stays inside or outside the country. 
http://www.cso.ie/releasespublications/documents/other_releases/2006/progress2006/
measuringirelandsprogress.pdf
Gross National Product
Gross National Product (GNP) is the total value of all goods and services produced in an economy in a 
given time period and which stays inside the country. 
http://www.cso.ie/releasespublications/documents/other_releases/2006/progress2006/
measuringirelandsprogress.pdf
Risk of poverty
This indicator focuses on the relative risk of poverty in relation to the rest of the population in a  
country rather than the absolute risk of poverty. Hence a person classified as in poverty in one country 
would not necessarily be classified as in poverty in another country if they were at the same absolute 
income level. 
http://www.cso.ie/releasespublications/documents/other_releases/2006/progress2006/
measuringirelandsprogress.pdf
Consistent poverty
This measure identifies the proportion of people, from those with an income below a certain threshold 
(less than 0% of median income), who are deprived of two or more goods or services considered 
essential for a basic standard of living e.g. a warm coat, sufficient food or adequate heating. The 
consistent poverty measure was devised in 98 using indicators of deprivation based on standards of
living at that time. The Government in 00 accepted the advice of the ESRI to revise the deprivation
indicators to better reflect current living standards and, in particular, to focus to a greater degree on 
items reflecting social inclusion and participation in society. This resulted in the measure, originally 
based on lacking one or more items from an 8-item index, changing to one based on lacking two or 
more items from the following -item index:
. Two pairs of strong shoes
. A warm waterproof overcoat
. Buy new not second-hand clothes
4. Eat meals with meat, chicken, fish (or vegetarian equivalent) every second day
. Have a roast joint or its equivalent once a week
. Had to go without heating during the last year through lack of money
. Keep the home adequately warm
8. Buy presents for family or friends at least once a year
9. Replace any worn out furniture
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0. Have family or friends for a drink or meal once a month
. Have a morning, afternoon or evening out in the last fortnight, for entertainment This revised  
 set of deprivation indicators will be used to measure consistent poverty over the duration of the  
 new NAPinclusion. The current (00) rate of consistent poverty using the new measure is .%,  
 having reduced from 8.% in 00.
Note that it is enforced deprivation that is relevant in this context. For example, a household may not 
have a roast once a week. The household is classified as deprived of this basic indicator only if the 
reason they didn’t have it was because they could not afford it.
http://www.cso.ie/releasespublications/documents/other_releases/2006/progress2006/
measuringirelandsprogress.pdf
At-risk-of-poverty rate: The ‘at risk of poverty’ indicator identifies all those (households or people) 
who fall below a certain income threshold, which in the EU has been set at 0% of the median income. 
Median income is the amount that divides the income distribution into two equal parts, half of people 
having incomes above the median and half having incomes below the median. This measure is the best 
known and quoted indicator as it affords some comparisons with other countries. It does not, however, 
measure poverty as such, but rather the proportion of people below a certain income threshold who 
may be ‘at risk of poverty’. Whether persons below the 0 per cent threshold are actually experiencing 
poverty will depend on a number of factors. These include:
• The degree to which income is below the relevant thresholds;
• The length of time on this relatively low income – a long such period can lead to real deprivation,  
 as a person’s assets run down and cannot be fully maintained or replaced;
• Possession and use of other assets, especially one’s own home.
http://www.cso.ie/releasespublications/documents/eu_silc/current/eusilc.pdf
Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 quintile share ratio): This is the ratio of total 
equivalised income received by the 0% of persons with the highest income (top quintile) to that 
received by the 0% of persons with the lowest income (lowest quintile). 
http://www.cso.ie/releasespublications/documents/eu_silc/current/eusilc.pdf
Relative at-risk-of-poverty gap: This is the difference between the median equivalised income of 
persons below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold and the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, expressed as a 
percentage of the at-risk-of-poverty threshold. The purpose of the indicator is to measure how far below 
the poverty threshold the median income of people at risk of poverty is. The closer the median income 
is to the threshold the smaller the percentage will be.
http://www.cso.ie/releasespublications/documents/eu_silc/current/eusilc.pdf
At-risk-of-poverty rate before social transfers: This indicator is calculated based on two 
alternative measures of equivalised income. The first calculates equivalised income as the total 
disposable household income including old-age and survivors’ benefits but excluding all other social 
transfers. The second excludes all social transfers. Any person with an equivalised income before social 
transfers of less than 0% of the median after social transfers is considered at risk of poverty before 
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social transfers (i.e. the same threshold is used for calculating the rate before and after social transfers). 
http://www.cso.ie/releasespublications/documents/eu_silc/current/eusilc.pdf
Gini coefficient: The gini-coefficient is commonly used to measure income inequality in a society. If 
there was perfect equality (i.e. each person receives the same income) the Gini coefficient would be 0%. 
A Gini coefficient of 00% would indicate there was total inequality and the entire national income was 
in the hands of one person. Ireland’s 00 gini co-efficient of .4 was higher than the previous two 
years and one of the highest in Europe.
http://www.cso.ie/releasespublications/documents/eu_silc/current/eusilc.pdf
At-persistent-risk-of-poverty rate: This is a measure of the share of persons with an equivalised 
total net income below the risk-of-poverty threshold in the current year and in at least two of the 
preceding three years. Thus the calculation of this indicator requires 4 years data. Although EU-SILC 
began in Ireland in 00, only half the target sample was interviewed. We have been able to calculate a 
provisional persistent risk of poverty rate of .% based on this data. However, we will not be able to 
produce a reliable estimate for this indicator until 00 data is analysed, at which point we will have 
four full years data (004-00).
http://www.cso.ie/releasespublications/documents/eu_silc/current/eusilc.pdf
National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS) indicators
At a national level, data from the EU-SILC is used to monitor and evaluate progress towards achieving 
the targets set out in the National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS). The NAPS was initiated by the 
Government after the 99 United Nations Social Summit in Copenhagen, Denmark. The strategy, 
launched in 99, sets out the extent of poverty, identifies the main themes, and formulates strategic 
responses to combat poverty in Ireland. The strategic aims of the NAPS fall into five key areas:
• Educational Disadvantage
• Unemployment
• Income adequacy
• Disadvantaged Urban Areas
• Rural Poverty
The key NAPS indicator derived from EU-SILC is the consistent poverty measure, which combines 
relative income measures with a lack of what are considered to be basic resources. Originally the NAPS 
referred to the calculation of the threshold as 0% of the mean equivalised income, but it is now 
generally accepted that 0% of the median is a more appropriate method.
http://www.cso.ie/releasespublications/documents/eu_silc/current/eusilc.pdf
Welfare State: a system whereby the state undertakes ostensibly to protect the health and well-being 
of its citizens, especially those in financial need. 
http://www.socialpolicy.ca/w-z.htm
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List of Abbreviations
CP: Community Platform
CPA: Combat Poverty Agency
CWC: Community Workers Co-op
DWS: Developmental Welfare State
ESRI: Economic and Social Research Institute
EU: European Union
EU-SILC: European Union- Survey on Income and Living Conditions
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
GNP: Gross National Product
GPI: Genuine Progress Indicator
NAPS: National Anti-Poverty Strategy
NAPinclusion: National Action Plan for Social Inclusion 00-0
NCC: National Competitiveness Council
NCCRI: National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism
NESC: National Economic and Social Council
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
RR: Replacement Ratios
T: Towards 0 Ten-Year Framework Social Partnership Agreement 00-0
UN HDI: United Nations Human Development Index
A BETTER IRELAND IS POSSIBLE–48–
Notes

???
???
????
???
???
????
???
??
???
????
?
???
????
????
??
????
????
?
????
???
??
????
???
?????
????
??
???
????
???
????
????
????
???
???
????
???
?
???
??
????
????
??
????
????
???
????
??
????
??
Community Platform
C/O Community Workers’ Co-operative
1st Floor, Unit 4, Tuam Rd. Centre, Tuam Rd.,
Galway
The Community Platform is a network of 28 National organisations  
which work to address poverty and social exclusion. 
 
Organisations currently in the Community Platform are: 
 
ATD 4th World
Age Action Ireland
Community Action Network 
Community Workers Cooperative 
Cairde
European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN) Ireland 
Gay and Lesbian Equality Network 
Immigrant Council of Ireland 
Irish Association of Older People 
Irish National Organisation of the Unemployed 
Irish Penal Reform Trust 
Irish Refugee Council 
Irish Rural Link 
Irish Traveller Movement 
Migrant Rights Centre Ireland 
National Adult Literacy Agency 
National Network of Women’s Refuges & Support Services 
National Traveller Women’s Forum 
National Women’s Council of Ireland 
Older Women’s Network 
OPEN
Pavee Point 
Rape Crisis Network Ireland 
Simon Communities of Ireland 
Threshold 
Voluntary Drug Treatment Network 
Vincentian Partnership for Justice 
Women’s Aid
T: +91 779030
F: +91 779033
E: annecostello@cwc.ie
W: www.cwc.ie
